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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 MADRID 000902

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SUBJECT: SPAIN'S ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION  
POLICYMAKING PROCESS

REF: A. SECSTATE 83600  
    1B. 08MADRID 780  
    1C. MADRID 179  
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    1E. MADRID 514  
    1F. MADRID 108  
    1G. MADRID 340  
    1H. MADRID 29  
    1I. 08 MADRID 1296  
    1J. 08 MADRID 1262

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Classified By: CDA Arnold A. Chacon for Reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4(d)

1. (C) SUMMARY. President Zapatero publicly has pledged that the Obama Administration can count on the "full support" of Spain on arms control and non-proliferation policy. Spain is strongly committed to these goals and is active in multiple fora on these issues. During Spain's EU Presidency in the first half of 2010, Madrid's views on these subjects will carry extra political significance at the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon). As requested in Ref A, this cable provides an overview of Spain's arms control and non-pro policy-making process. END SUMMARY.

//Spanish Positions on Non-Pro and Disarmament Issues//

2. (C) Zapatero held his first formal one-on-one bilateral meeting with President Obama on April 5, the same day the President delivered his "Prague Speech" outlining his Administration's commitment to non-proliferation and arms control, including reinvigorated U.S.-Russian arms control efforts. Following their bilateral meeting, Zapatero publicly stated that the event marked "a new era for relations between Spain and the United States" and "guaranteed" Spain would support Obama's "greatly significant" call to curb nuclear arms. Zapatero emphasized his support by declaring, "Rather than asking ourselves what

Obama can do, we should ask ourselves how we can support Obama so these ideas can be accomplished."

¶3. (C) The Zapatero Administration frames its dedication to non-pro and disarmament within the context of its strict adherence to international law and its commitment to civil society, peace and human rights, according to Luis Gomez, the MFA's Head of Disarmament. Gomez explained to POLOFF on August 20 that Zapatero-era GOS initiatives to ban cluster munitions (Ref B) and to support the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development should be viewed within this context.

¶4. (C) The GOS provided a detailed outline of its views and lists of priorities in advance of the 2010 NPT RevCon in Ref ¶C. Carlos Torres, Counselor for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in the MFA's DG for Strategic Affairs & Terrorism, told POLOFF on September 2 that the GOS is prepared to be assetive in negotiations to conclude the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). He also indicated that Madrid urges the U.S. Senate to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and wants the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to resolve its negotiations with Pakistan. Torres stated that Madrid is open to any dialogue with the USG on its positions in any of these upcoming fora.

¶5. (C) Madrid's views will carry extra political significance during the May, 2010 NPT RevCon. A board member of the IAEA during 2008-2010, Spain will hold the EU Presidency during the first half of 2010. A Plenary Meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) also is scheduled to be held in New Zealand during the first half of 2010. A founding member of the Proliferation Security Initiative, Spain participates in the Container Security Initiative (CSI, in the ports of

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Algeciras, Barcelona, and Valencia) and the Megaports Initiative to detect radioactive cargo (at the port in Algeciras) and is being considered for membership in the G-8 Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (See Ref D). Spain hosted the Plenary Meeting and a number of other events related to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) in 2008 and has remained active in 2009, contributing at a number of workshops.

//Key Decision-Makers//

¶6. (S) The MFA has the lead role on arms control and nonproliferation issues. Deputy FM Angel Lossada, a career diplomat, has a background in non-proliferation and disarmament and was in the midst of organizing the GICNT Plenary in Madrid in June 2008 when he was named to his current position. Embassy Madrid appreciated his non-pro efforts and - as Deputy FM - Lossada has been the Head of Delegation for the GOS at non-proliferation and disarmament events. His successor as the MFA's Director General (A/S-level) for Strategic Affairs and Terrorism, Carmen Bujan, has been less focused on non-proliferation. Post has taken steps (See Ref E) to engage her key deputy on these issues, Deputy DG for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Gonzalo de Salazar, who wrote his Ph.D. dissertation on non-proliferation issues. Miguel Aguirre de Carcer, whom Luis Gomez and other MFA officials hold in high regard for his expertise, serves as the MFA's Special Ambassador for Disarmament, although Post has had few dealings with him in his current capacity. Gomez specializes in chemical, biological and small arms/conventional arms disarmament while Carlos Torres is a nuclear expert whose views carry significant weight within the MFA.

¶7. (C) Other key ministries include: the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce, which has oversight over Spain's civil nuclear industry, the Nuclear Security Council (CSN) - Spain's nuclear regulatory agency; and the Ministry of Defense's Spanish Verification Unit (UVE), which is

involved in verification of arms control commitments. The GOS also has an inter-ministerial board that meets monthly to review, among other things, proliferation and disarmament personnel are stretched thin during such meetings. Bujan, Salazar, Gomez, and Torres regularly travel to New York, Vienna, Geneva and elsewhere. Given that MFA personnel often travel to these Missions, Embassy Madrid judges that it is unlikely that those Missions have much flexibility on using innovative negotiating tactics to reach RevCon objectives, for example.

¶9. (C) The GOS already is taking steps to remedy this personnel shortage. As of late August 2009, the MFA was expanding its office space and considerably increasing its non-pro and disarmament staffing in anticipation of an increasing workload before and during Spain's EU Presidency. Gomez told POLOFF that former Deputy DG for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Marco Rodriguez Cantero (the predecessor of Salazar's predecessor), will return to work on these issues, assisted by two more junior officers. Vicente Garrido, Director of the Madrid-based International Affairs and Foreign Policy Institute (INCIPE) and an excellent Post contact, has been named Special Adviser to the MFA on non-proliferation and disarmament issues and will report to Salazar.

¶10. (C) The GOS also is shuffling and reinforcing its staff

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at key diplomatic missions on these subject areas. In Geneva, Amb. Javier Garrigues, the Permanent Representative to the CD, works on both nuclear non-proliferation and arms control issues while Amb. Luis Javier Gil Catalina, who should be arriving soon as the new Deputy Perm Rep, and Counselor Helena Cossano work only on arms control. At the UN Mission, Perm Rep. Juan Antonio Yanez-Barnuevo does not have an arms control or non-proliferation background per se, although he served nine years (1982-91) as Spain's National Security Advisor-equivalent. Deputy Perm Rep Roman Oyarzun was an engaging and open-minded contact of U.S. diplomats when he worked on non-pro issues and NPT in the mid-1990s, including during Spain's 1995 EU Presidency. At the Spanish Mission to the IAEA, recently-arrived DCM Santiago Martinez-Caro (a dual-national with US citizenship) has made a positive first impression and appears well briefed. He joins three other diplomats who work non-pro and disarmament issues. They report to Ambassador Jose Luis Rosello, who represents Spain on the IAEA BOG.

//Factors that Underpin GOS Positions//

¶11. (C) Spain is a committed member of the EU and usually supports EU consensus on arms control and non-pro issues. During its EU Presidency, Madrid is unlikely to pursue any policies that diverge from any existing EU consensus. Perhaps the sole exception is discussed below in Para 13.

//Spanish Sensitivities And How Best to Engage the GOS//

¶12. (C) Spain reacts best to gestures that demonstrate that the USG values Spain as a partner. Madrid wants the USG to keep Spain in the loop on strategic discussions. Spanish officials may be sensitive to the fact that the USG would not meet Luis Echavarri, Spain's nominee as IAEA DG, in Washington in the run-up to the July 2009 vote and that the Spanish Ambassador to Washington also had trouble getting an appointment to discuss Echavarri's candidacy.

¶13. (C) One outstanding issue in the bilateral relationship on nuclear issues is the GOS's ongoing dissatisfaction with revisions to Paragraphs 6 and 7 to the NSG's Guidelines for Transfers of Enrichment & Reprocessing Equipment and Technology. (See Refs H - J.) While Spain as of late August would be happy if the Department of State were amenable to the most recent draft of Paragraph 7 that is circulating, Paragraph 6 could still remain problematic. Spain sees Para

6 as a complete non-starter if there is any mention of the Treaty of Pelindaba, which went into effect on July 15, 2009.

Sources within the MFA say the GOS could "never" accept a revised Paragraph 6 that mentions the Treaty, which establishes a Nuclear Free Zone in Africa, which the Treaty defines as including Spain's Canary Islands. Our contact suggests it boils down to a sovereignty issue akin to Spain asking the US to endorse a Treaty in which Japan or South Korea claimed that Hawaii is Asian.

¶14. (S//NF) Post has taken a number of steps to engage the GOS on non-proliferation and disarmament issues. Washington TDYers in May 2009 gave a releasable, classified briefing to the Spanish MFA (and separately to Spanish intelligence officials) on Syria's recent proliferation efforts, which has been instrumental in building trust and opening channels of communication. (See Ref E).

¶15. (C) In response to a request by Garrido and the MFA, Post has invited Robert Einhorn, Special Advisor for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control, to travel to Madrid as a guest speaker at a closed-door conference with GOS officials on these issues. This event presents an opportunity to engage GOS counterparts on potential areas for cooperation regarding the NPT, the FMCT, the CTBT, the NPT RevCon and other issues.

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